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Abstract. The 2016 is remembered as the year that showed to the world
how dangerous Distributed Denial of Service attacks can be. Gauge of
the disruptiveness of DDoS attacks is the number of bots involved: the
bigger the botnet, the more powerful the attack. This character, along
with the increasing availability of connected and insecure IoT devices,
makes DDoS and IoT the perfect pair for the malware industry. In this
paper we present the main idea behind AntibIoTic, a palliative solution
to prevent DDoS attacks perpetrated through IoT devices.
1 The AntibIoTic Against DDoS Attacks
Today, it’s a matter of fact that IoT devices are extremely poorly secured and
many different IoT malwares are exploiting this insecurity trend to spread glob-
ally in the IoT world and build large-scale botnets later used for extremely
powerful cyber-attacks [1,2], especially Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
[3]. Therefore, the main problem that has to be solved is the low security level
of the IoT cosmos, and that is where AntibIoTic comes in.
What drove us in the design of AntibIoTic is the belief that the intrinsic
weakness of IoT devices might be seen as the solution of the problem instead of
as the problem itself. In fact, the idea is to use the vulnerability of IoT units as
a means to grant their security: like an antibiotic that enters in the bloodstream
and travels through human body killing bacteria without damaging human cells,
AntibIoTic is a worm that infects vulnerable devices and creates a white botnet
of safe systems, removing them from the clutches of other potential dangerous
malwares. Basically, it exploits the most efficient spreading capabilities of exist-
ing IoT malwares (such as Mirai) in order to compete with them in exploiting
and infecting weak IoT hosts but, once control is gained, instead of taking ad-
vantage of them, it performs several operations aimed to notify the owner about
the security threats of his device and potentially acting on his behalf to fix them.
In our plans, AntibIoTic will raise the IoT environment to a safer level, mak-
ing the life way harsher for DDoS capable IoT malwares that should eventually
slowly disappear. Moreover, the whole solution has been designed including some
functionalities aimed at creating a bridge between security experts, devices man-
ufacturers and users, in order to increase the awareness about the IoT security
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problem and potentially pushing all of them to do their duties for a more secure
global Internet.
Similar approaches have been occasionally tried so far [4,5,6] but, to the
best of our knowledge, they have mostly been rudimentary and not documented
pieces of code referable to crackers (or, as wrongly but commonly named, hack-
ers) that want to solve the IoT security problem by taking the law into their
own hands, thus poorness or even lack of preventive design and documentation
are the common traits. Nevertheless, these attempts are the proof that the pro-
posed solution is feasible and parts of their source code have been published
under OpenGL license [7], which makes them reusable for the implementation
of AntibIoTic.
The paper continues presenting a high level overview of the AntibIoTic func-
tionalities and infrastructure, respectively in Sections 2-3. Then, a comparison
with existing similar approaches is given in Section 4, and legal and ethical
implications are discussed in Section 5.
2 AntibIoTic Functionalities
Looking from an high level perspective, the AntibIoTic functionalities include,
but are not limited to:
– Publish useful data and statistics - Thanks to the infrastructure behind the
AntibIoTic worm, IoT security best practises and botnet statistics computed
from the data collected by the worm, can be published online and made
available to anyone interested (not only experts);
– Expose interactive interfaces - Interactive interfaces with different privileges
are also publicly exposed in order to let anyone join and improve the An-
tibIoTic solution;
– Sanitize infected devices - Once the control of a weak device is gained, the
AntibIoTic worm cleans it up from other possibly running malicious mal-
wares and secure its perimeter avoiding further intrusions;
– Notify device owners - After making sure the device has been sanitized, the
AntibIoTic worm tries to notify the device owner pointing out the device vul-
nerabilities. The notification aim is to make the owner aware of the security
threats of his device and give him some advices to solve them;
– Secure vulnerable devices - Once notified the device owner, if the security
threats haven’t been fixed yet, the AntibIoTic worm starts to apply all the
possible security best practises aimed to secure the device. For instance, it
may change the admin credentials and update the firmware;
– Resistance to reboot - AntibIoTic incorporates a basic mechanism that let
it keep track of all spotted vulnerable devices and, if a target device reboot
occurs, it is able to reinfect them as soon as they are up and running. More-
over, in order to avoid the worm to be wiped off from device memory by a
simple reboot, the AntibIoTic worm may also use an advanced mechanism to
persistently settle into the target system by modifying its startup settings.
Fig. 1. Device owner secures its device after receiving the AntibIoTic notification
Please consider that the functionalities presented above are only an high
level summary of the AntibIoTic set of functions, aimed to give the reader a
first conception of the solution. A more clear explanation of the AntibIoTic
modus operandi is given in Section 3.
2.1 Real World Scenarios
Given the basic idea behind AntibIoTic, in this subsection we will get through
some different working scenarios that the AntibIoTic worm could face during
its propagation and in which a subset of the aforementioned functionalities are
used. Each scenario will be presented using an high level graphical workflow and
a brief textual explanation.
Scenario 1 - Awareness notification The first scenario is the one shown in
Figure 1. It is the ideal situation in which as soon as the device owner sees the
AntibIoTic notification, he performs some of the suggested operations in order
to secure the device.
Fig. 2. Credentials change after persistent installation
First of all, AntibIoTic scans the Internet looking for IoT weak devices. As
soon as a vulnerable device is found, it is infected and sanitized in order to secure
its perimeter and ensure that no other malwares are in execution on the same
device. Subsequently, the awareness notification is sent to the owner pointing out
the security threats of the device and some possible countermeasures to solve
them. Then, the scrupulous device owner looks at the notification and secures its
device following the guidelines given by AntibIoTic. At this point, the IoT device
is not vulnerable anymore thus the AntibIoTic intent has been reached and it can
terminate its execution freeing the device. More elaborate (and, probably, real)
cases, in which the owner doesn’t perform any action to increase the security
level of its device, are presented in the following scenarios.
Scenario 2 - Credentials change on a rebooted device The second scenario
is depicted in Figure 2. In this case, the device owner is impassive to the AntibI-
oTic notification and a device reboot occurs while AntibIoTic is performing its
security tasks. However, thanks to the persistent installation and the credentials
change functionalities, AntibIoTic is able to secure the device as well.
As seen in the first scenario, at first AntibIoTic looks for a vulnerable de-
vice, infects and sanitizes it, and notifies its owner. Nevertheless, in this case,
the device owner either ignore or doesn’t see the AntibIoTic notification, thus he
performs no actions. Whereby, AntibIoTic starts to secure the device by checking
if it’s possible to settle down on the hosting device in order to resist to potential
Fig. 3. Firmware update after reinfection
reboots. In this scenario, we are hypothesizing that the persistent installation is
possible hence the AntibIoTic worm persistently settles down on the vulnerable
device. Now, let’s suppose a device reboot occurs. However, since AntibIoTic
has been persistently installed on the device, after the reboot it starts again and
quietly picks its tasks up where it left off. It checks if a credentials change is
possible. In this scenario, we are supposing that it is allowed, thus the AntibI-
oTic worm changes the admin credentials. Now, thanks to the security actions
performed, the target device is not vulnerable anymore, hence the AntibIoTic
worm terminates its execution and frees the device.
Scenario 3 - Firmware update of a reinfected device The third scenario
is shown in Figure 3. It is a harsh environment for AntibIoTic, since persistent
installation and credentials change are not possible and a device reboot occurs
while it is performing its duties. Nevertheless, thanks to its reboot-resistant
design, it is able to reinfect the device and secure it through a firmware update.
The first part of the workflow moves along same lines as the aforementioned
scenarios: AntibIoTic finds a vulnerable device, infects and sanitizes it, notifies
the owner. Also in this case the owner doesn’t perform any action, so the An-
tibIoTic worm checks if the persistent installation is possible. In this case, we
are hypothesizing that it is not allowed and that a device reboot occurs before
AntibIoTic can perform any other operation. So, the hosting device is rebooted
and our worm is wiped off from its memory. Nevertheless, the AntibIoTic infras-
tructure detects the reboot and monitors the target device to reveal whenever
it is up and running again. As soon as again available, the vulnerable device is
reinfected and resanitized by the AntibIoTic worm. Now, it continues to perform
its actions checking if credentials change is possible. We are supposing that it is
not, so AntibIoTic looks if a firmware update is feasible. Let’s suppose that it
is and our worm downloads and installs an up-to-date firmware on the hosting
device. Now, the target device is safe and the AntibIoTic worm can stop its
execution freeing the device.
3 Overview of AntibIoTic Infrastructure
The overall architecture of AntibIoTic (Figure 4) is mostly arisen from the Mirai
infrastructure. This choice has been driven by the strong evidence of robustness
and efficiency that Mirai gave to the world the last year as well as by the ascer-
tainment that, despite its efficiency, the Mirai architecture is relatively simple
and most of the source code needed for its implementation is already available
online [8], which makes it easily reusable.
Fig. 4. AntibIoTic infrastructure
At a macroscopic level, the AntibIoTic infrastructure is made of several com-
ponents and actors interacting with each other.
3.1 Command-and-Control (CNC) Server
It is the central component of the infrastructure. It is in charge of performing
several tasks interacting with other actors and components. It is composed of
different modules:
– Web Server - It is the module that exposes the botnet human interface with
human actors. It shows some useful data and live statistics and supports
the interaction with two type of actors, each allowed to perform different
operations: user, admin;
– Reporter - It is the module in charge of receiving and processing vulnerability
results and relevant notifications sent by AntibIoTic Bots;
– Spotter - It is the module that handles the keep-alive messages continuously
sent from AntibIoTic Bot Sentinel modules, ensuring a working connectiv-
ity with each infected devices. If for some reason (e.g., device reboot) the
communication between the Spotter and the device is lost, the former im-
mediately notifies the Loader to periodically try to gain the control of the
insecure device again;
– Loader - It is the module that uses the received vulnerability results to
remotely infect and gain control of insecure devices. It is also in charge of
loading up-to-date modules on and sending commands to AntibIoTic Bots;
– Data Manager - It is the module which exposes the API to access all data
saved on the Storage. Each module of the CNC Server interacts with Data
Manager to perform any operation to local data.
All data and files relevant for the whole infrastructure are saved in the Storage.
It is accessible by all the modules of the CNC Server through the Data Manager.
3.2 AntibIoTic Bot
It is the component running on vulnerable devices with the aim of securing them.
It is composed of distinct modules in order to perform different tasks:
– Stub - It is the main module of the worm. It is in charge of starting most
of the other modules and listening for further commands or module updates
received from the Loader module of the CNC Server;
– Sentinel - It is the module in charge of continuously communicating with
the Spotter module of the CNC Server. It mainly sends keep-alive messages
or local reboot notifications to the Spotter;
– Scanner - It is the module that scans for new vulnerable IoT devices using
a list of well-know credentials. Once a weak device is found, its informa-
tion are sent back to the Reporter module of the CNC Server. This module
corresponds to the Mirai Bot Scanner module;
– Sanitizer - It is the module that cleans up the target device by both erad-
icating other potential running malwares and performing safety operations
aimed to secure the device from further intrusions. This module is alike the
Mirai Bot Killer module;
– Vaccine - It is the module that performs several operations directed to in-
crease the security level of the target device. The number and type of per-
formed actions depend on the nature of the hosting device and some of them
can involve human interaction.
3.3 Users and Admin
Users are one of the human actors involved in the AntibIoTic infrastructure. It
can interact with the Web Server module of the CNC Server just to get known
about relevant data and live statistics or it can actively contribute to the project
by submitting new information about additional security threats affecting IoT
devices.
Finally, Admin is the human actor in charge of supervising the AntibIoTic
infrastructure. It can perform operations on data saved in the Storage as well as
send control commands to the botnet (further details and consideration about
this last option will follow). It is also in charge of reviewing information submit-
ted by users in order to discard them or accept them and accordingly update
the involved AntibIoTic modules.
4 AntibIoTic and Its ”Twins”
As previously mentioned, there are already some so-called ”vigilantes” [4,5,6]
out there which have been built with an aim similar to the AntibIoTic one, thus
it is more than legitimate to wonder: ”why is AntibIoTic better than its twins?”.
We won’t directly answer to the question, but we want to address it by providing
a comparison between AntibIoTic and the other existing solutions (also referred
as ”twins”), which is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Comparison between AntibIoTic and similar solutions
Twins
AntibIoTic
BrickerBot Hajime Linux.Wifatch
Publicly documented - - - 3
Create awareness and encourage
synergy
- - 3 3
Notify infected device owners - 3 3 3
Temporary security operations 3 3 3 3
Permanent security operations - - - 3
First of all, we do not claim that our solution is absolutely better than the
others, basically because we have not enough data to assert it. Indeed, to the
best of our knowledge, the existent solutions are not documented at all and the
only sources of information that we can use to make a comparison are some
security analysis and reverse engineering works found online, which try to point
out the main traits of each white worm. The closest thing to a documentation
that we saw in the wild is the Linux.Wifatch GitHub repository [7] which pro-
vides a rough explanation of the source code folders hierarchy and some general
comments about the authors’ purpose. Nevertheless, it doesn’t give a clear pre-
sentation of the whole infrastructure and it doesn’t explain how each component
interacts with the others, thus we won’t consider it as an actual documentation.
That is, for us, the first plus point for AntibIoTic, since with this work we are
providing a presentation as clear as possible of our solution that can be intended
as documentation. Let’s now proceed toward an high level functional analysis in
order to continue the comparison.
Starting the functionalities review from the AntibIoTic infrastructure, it soon
becomes evident the bridge that the CNC Server wants to create between An-
tibIoTic and the people. Indeed, our solution wishes to interact with experts,
devices manufacturers and common users in order to show them how critique
and dangerous the current IoT security situation is and potentially pushing them
to do their best (e.g., put into practice the basic security recommendation) to
improve it. Moreover, AntibIoTic give them the chance of interacting with the
whole infrastructure by submitting useful information that could be used by the
white worm to be more powerful and effective. That is because our aim is not
to build a sneaky worm that stabs the device owners in the back and which the
people should be scared of, but we want to build a white worm that owners are
happy to see on their devices since it helps them by giving some advices or by
securing the devices in their behalf. Apparently, no one of the AntibIoTic twins
tries to create the same empathy with the common people but Linux.Wifatch,
whose authors published the source code and explained their purpose encour-
aging people to take part in the project. Therefore, even if the way in which
it is performed is different from the AntibIoTic approach, we can say that also
Linux.Wifatch is aimed to both create awareness about the IoT security problem
and encourage the collaboration of people to implement a white worm that tries
to improve the current situation.
Talking about the actual worm functionalities, that is where most of the
similarities are. First of all, almost all the twins notify the infected IoT device
owner telling him that his device is insecure and some security operations are
needed. That is, more or less, the same behaviour of AntibIoTic. Secondly, all the
twins try to perform some operations aimed to secure the target device. The type
of performed operations differs from solution to solution and from hosting device
to hosting device but the high level result is almost always the same: keep the
device safe until the memory is wiped off. The same goal is reached by AntibIoTic
but, unlike its twins, it goes ahead and tries to permanently secure the hosting
device. The only twin that tries to accomplish the same goal is BrickerBot.
However, relevant is to point out the way in which BrickerBot achieves its aim.
It usually tries to permanently secure the hosting unit without damaging it but,
if that is not possible, it writes random bits on the device storage often bricking it
and requiring the owner to replace it. This kind of malicious behaviour has been
classified as a Permanent Denial of Service (PDoS) attack [9] and we strongly
disapprove of it, because it does not fit the ”white” purpose of this class of worms.
So, even if the aim of BrickerBot author is to permanently secure IoT devices [10],
and somehow it actually achieves it (insecure devices are irredeemably damaged,
thus put offline), in our comparison we will not consider BrickerBot as a white
worm that permanently secure IoT devices because the way in which it is done
can not be treated as legitimate and thus accepted.
To sum up, from the Table 1 the main threads of the comparison between
AntibIoTic and the other similar solutions can be extrapolated. All the exist-
ing solutions basically lack of a solid documentation that clarifies their aim and
structure. Moreover, even if most of them notify the owner of the infected device
and push him to secure it, they do not try to create a connection with all people
in order to increase the global awareness about the IoT security problem and
stimulate a profitable interaction with them to improve the situation. Further-
more, as widely said by several security experts, the main problem of all the
AntibIoTic twins is that they usually have a short lifespan on the target device
since their actions are only temporary and, as soon as the hosting device is re-
booted, they are wiped off from memory and the unit goes back to its unsafe
state. That is not applicable to AntibIoTic, since it is provided with some unique
and smart functionalities, such as resistance to reboot and firmware update, that
allow it to resist to reboot and permanently secure infected devices.
Basically, AntibIoTic can be considered an evolution of the current white
worms which picks the best from them and also adds some new functionalities
to both fix their mistakes and propose a new idea of joint participation to the
IoT security process.
5 Ethical and Legal Implications
It is undeniable that the proposed solution drags on some ethical and legal
implications, mainly arisen by the intent of gaining control of unaware vulnerable
devices, even if it is done for security purposes.
Sometimes the line between ethical and unethical behaviour is a fine one and,
whenever we try to design a possible solution to a malicious conduct, we can
not be exempt from asking ourselves if our proposal goes too far. Even though
AntibIoTic is motivated by the desire of fixing a harsh situation created by firms
unforgivable negligence, it requires to break-in third-party devices without the
owners’ explicit consent, which is an illegal and prosecutable practice in several
countries. Nevertheless, we can not ignore that, accordingly to various legisla-
tions, also the very action of failing to protect your own device and unwillingly
participating to a malicious action could be considered illegal. This entails that
our solution could be warmly welcomed and tolerated by the less knowledgeable
users worried to incur in possible prosecution, but unable to apply themselves a
more adequate and stronger security policy.
Somehow, we can think about AntibIoTic as a scapegoat that secures IoT
devices and impedes them to cause any harm. A scapegoat that accepts the risk
to be accused for the hosts infection, but both increases the IoT security and
keeps safe the users avoiding them to incur into tough prosecutions.
Therefore, what we are indirectly asking to the users is to blindly trust that
both AntibIoTic and its maintainers are well-meaning. We known that it is a
greedy claim, but we also believe that it can be achieved through the power of
a large community that supports and trusts the project, and which is willing to
work in order to improve it. Accordingly, what we are basically thinking of, is
a single word: open-source. We strongly feel, to such an extent that we would
define it mandatory, that AntibIoTic, as well as other similar approaches, should
be released as open-source projects in order to fulfil two main benefits.
The first one is to build trust between the project and the IoT users, because
only a strong trust into the project solidity and well-meaning can ensure the
people collaboration. Furthermore, we highlight that the more discretion is left to
AntibIoTic admins, the more concerns will be risen into the device owners when
it is asked them to trust a stranger to fully control their device. That is why, even
if the AntibIoTic capabilities are completely transparent, the discretion power
granted to the admins should be as limited as possible, ideally giving them only
the option to shut down the whole botnet or release a single device, if required.
However, supposing for a moment that a high level of trust can be reached,
we do not pretend to be considered better than others, hence we know that
the resulting white botnet could always being hacked and used for malicious
purposes. That is where the second open-source benefit comes in: an open-source
project would attract other white-hat volunteers and companies that share our
willingness to fight the IoT security threats, which would ensure a more updated,
efficient and reliable software.
Truth be told, we are very concerned about users’ privacy and we feel that the
path traced by AntibIoTic should not be taken by anyone, because it could un-
expectedly backfire and expose the vulnerabilities to malicious users, no matter
if criminal organisations or intelligence agencies, that could exfiltrate highly-
sensitive personal data. The only reason why we suggest this solution, continu-
ously stressing about the transparency requirements, is that the current situation
is beyond any control and something has to be done before it gets even worse.
We are basically in front of the eternal dispute between freedom and security,
and we are aware that the very right answer does not exist. However, to conclude,
since we strongly believe that ”my freedom ends where yours begins”, we would
like to leave the reader with a final question: what should we do when your
freedom affects our security?
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have presented the main idea behind AntibIoTic, a system
to prevent DDoS attacks perpetrated through IoT devices. The functionalities
of the system have been listed and some scenarios discussed. Comparison with
similar approaches provides evidence that AntibIoTic represents a promising
solution to the DDoS attacks problem in the IoT context.
The key task of future work consists in the full implementation and eval-
uation of the system. In particular, architectural design has to be considered
(or reconsidered) thoroughly. The architecture described in Figure 4 shows a
number of interacting components that need to scale up as the number of de-
vices also scale up. It has has been shown that scalability issues can naturally
be solved by use of microservice architecture [11,12], and that large-size compa-
nies have already implemented migrations to this architectural style [13]. Fur-
thermore, specific programming languages are available to support microservice
architecture [14,15]. Full deployment of the system should consider a migration
to microservice, possibly making use of a suitable language and relying on the
expertise of our team on the matter. Finally, a project on microservice-based
IoT for smart buildings is currently running [16,17], and it certainly represents
a solid case study for experimentation and validation.
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